A distinctive feature of a clustered observational study is its multilevel or nested data structure arising from the assignment of treatment, in a non-random manner, to groups or clusters of individuals. Examples are ubiquitous in the health and social sciences including patients in hospitals, employees in firms, and students in schools. What is the optimal matching strategy in a clustered observational study? At first thought, one might start by matching clusters of individuals and then, within matched clusters, continue by matching individuals. But, as we discuss in this paper, the optimal strategy is the opposite: first match individuals and, once all possible combinations of matched individuals are known, then match clusters. In this paper we use dynamic and integer programming to implement this strategy and extend optimal matching methods to hierarchical and multilevel settings. In particular, our method attempts to replicate a paired clustered randomized study by finding the largest sample of matched pairs of treated and control individuals within matched pairs of treated and control clusters that is balanced according to specifications given by the user. We illustrate our method on a case study of the comparative effectiveness of public versus private voucher schools in Chile, a question of intense policy debate in the country at the present.
Introduction

Observational Studies with Multilevel Data
Many policy evaluations occur in settings where randomized experiments are difficult or impossible. When randomized interventions are not possible researchers often choose to conduct an observational study. Cochran and Chambers (1965) defined an observational study as an empirical comparison of treated and control groups where the objective is to elucidate cause-and-effect relationships in contexts where it is not feasible to use controlled experimentation and subjects select their own treatment status. When subjects select their own treatments, differing outcomes may reflect initial differences in treated and control groups rather than treatment effects (Cochran and Chambers 1965; Rubin 1974) . Pretreatment differences or selection biases amongst subjects come in two forms: those that have been accurately measured, which are overt biases, and those that are unmeasured but are suspected to exist which are hidden biases. In an observational study of treatment effects, analysts use pretreatment covariates and a statistical adjustment strategy to remove overt biases. Sensitivity analysis can be applied to understand whether observed estimates are sensitive to hidden biases (Rosenbaum 2002) .
Observational studies often occur in settings where the data have a multilevel or hierarchical structure with covariates observed at two or more levels (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Gelman and Hill 2006) . Multilevel data structures are common in the social sciences. Educational settings are perhaps the most well-known multilevel structure where we observe student level measures such as gender, but also school level covariates such as the proportion of female students and the size of the school (Hill 2013) . Other multilevel data structures include patients within hospitals, households within villages, and firms within industries among others. Often, we are interested in the effects of a treatment administered at the group level on individual level outcomes. For example, a study may focus on the effect of a school level treatment on student level outcomes.
A conventional approach to an evaluation problem with multilevel data would use a hierarchical regression model to account for the nested structure of the data and remove overt biases. A hierarchical regression model allows an analyst to fit a regression model using unit level covariates while accounting for unexplained variation among clusters. The cluster level predictors are often referred to as "contextual effects," and may be interpreted as causal effects under certain assumptions (Gelman 2006) .
One alternative to regression modeling are methods based on propensity scores that account for the hierarchical structure of the data (Hong and Raudenbush 2006; Li et al. 2013; Arpino and Mealli 2011) . Matching methods are also frequently used to remove overt biases in an observational study. Matched samples are constructed by finding close matches to stochastically balance a large number of covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . Ideally, such matches are constructed using an optimization algorithm (Rosenbaum 1989a; Ming and Rosenbaum 2000; Hansen 2004; Zubizarreta 2012) . Matching methods, however, do not typically account for multilevel data structures.
To adapt matching to multilevel data, one might imagine constructing a matched sample that first matches group covariates and then individual level covariates within matched groups. For example, with a school level treatment, a naive approach to this matching problem would be to first match school level covariates and then based on the sample of matched schools match students. We show this naive approach is actually a nonoptimal way to construct such a matched sample of clusters and units. Here, we develop an optimal matching method for multilevel data structures. Our method can match at multiple levels which allows us to balance both units and clusters. Counterintuitively our method first matches units and then clusters to create matched pairs of clusters with units matched within these cluster pairs. We apply our matching method to an observational study of whether students that attend private vouchers schools perform better on achievement tests. We now describe the motivating example.
Vouchers and School Choice
Governments often enact policy reforms to improve educational outcomes. One educational reform replaces residential choice with education markets as the method of school selection.
Citing public schools as inefficient local monopolies, Friedman (1955) proposed the concept vouchers to create education markets. Under this system, parents would use a voucher to choose among a number of competing schools both public and private. Competition among schools for students would in time increase the quality of education as parents selected the best schools and poor schools would be driven out of the market. While voucher systems are relatively rare in the United States, many other countries, however, have adopted universal voucher programs.
1
Countries with universal voucher programs include Chile, Denmark, Netherlands, South Korea and Sweden (Lara et al. 2011) .
Chile was the first country to adopt a universal voucher system as the military regime there undertook a number of large scale free market reforms in the 1980's. In education, management of public schools was transferred to municipal governments and a voucher system was implemented.
Three types of schools were created: public schools, private voucher schools, and private schools.
Purely private schools are privately run and do not receive any government funding; funding is entirely financed by tuition paid by parents. Public and private voucher schools receive a direct payment on a per-student basis. This system fueled the growth of a parallel private education system. By 2006, nearly 5,000 private voucher schools existed, and these schools enrolled nearly 44% of students with 47.7% attending public schools (Lara et al. 2011) .
Are these private vouchers schools more effective than public schools? Current evidence on the voucher system in Chile is mixed. A number of studies have found that private voucher schools increase test scores by 15% to 20% of a standard deviation (Mizala and Romaguera 2001; Sapelli and Vial 2002, 2005; Anand et al. 2009 ). Other studies have found either effects that are not statistically detectable (Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; McEwan 2001) or are much smaller (Lara et al. 1 As of 2007, only 16% of U.S. students lived in areas with an active voucher system. 2011). We conduct an observational study of whether private voucher schools produce students with higher test scores than public schools. These data have a multilevel structure in that we observe student level covariates such as gender and socio-economic status as well as school level covariates such as enrollment and whether the school is in an urban or rural area. Using a new matching algorithm, we are able to optimally pair both students and schools based on observed covariates to produce both matched schools and students that are similar. Moreover, our matching method allows for different balance constraints such that we can impose mean balance constraints on some covariates while fine-balancing other covariates.
Our study also provides a basic template for the design of observational studies of school level interventions. Critically, we consider how temporal ordering is critical to selecting covariates for the removal of overt biases. One important aspect of an observational study is the use of longitudinal data to avoid conditioning on a post-treatment covariate. If data are carefully collected over time as events occur, then the temporal order of events is clear, and the distinction between covariates and outcomes is clear as well. In contrast, if data are collected from subjects at a single time, as in a cross-sectional study, such temporal order is unclear and one might mistakenly condition on an outcome. In this study, we use the transition from primary school to secondary school to clearly delineate the temporal order of pre-and post-treatment covariates.
The data Chilean form a full panel over time which allows us to carefully separate both school and student level covariates from outcomes.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Chilean school system, the longitudinal census data, and the design that we use in our study. Section 3 reviews cardinality matching for finding the largest matched sample that is balanced, explains the multilevel matching method, and presents the method more generally. Section 4 shows the resulting matches. Section 5 analyzes the comparative effectiveness of public and private voucher schools in Chile. Section 6 concludes with a summary and a discussion. In Chile there are three basic types of schools: (i) private non-subsidized schools, (ii) private subsidized schools, and (iii) public schools, also called municipal schools. Private non-subsidized schools are generally elite schools that do not receive any funds from the state and are funded entirely through private tuition. Approximately 7% of the students in Chile attend this type of schools. Private subsidized schools receive vouchers from the state, and some of these schools charge an additional monthly tuition fee to parents (these are called "shared funding" private subsidized schools or "financiamiento compartido" in Spanish). These schools are a mix of forprofit and not-for-profit organizations. Approximately 53% of the students in Chile attend this type of school. Finally, most public schools receive vouchers from the state, and approximately 40% of students attend public schools.
2 In Chile, the voucher system is based on a direct payment to the schools as a function of daily attendance.
We face two challenges in our observational study, if we simply compare the test scores of students in these two types of schools and remove overt biases via matching. First, the choice to attend a private voucher school may be made before the first grade but data are not collected on students until they are in the fourth grade. Without measurements that precede the treatment, we may mistakenly adjust for an outcome rather than a covariate and bias the study (Rosenbaum 1984) .
Second, the choice to attend a private voucher school is most likely highly confounded by not only observed but unobserved factors. To solve both problems, we exploit an opportunity, an unusual setting in which there is less confounding with unobserved covariates than occurs in the standard setting (Rosenbaum 2010, p. 113 ).
The opportunity we exploit is parallel to the concept of a differential effect (Rosenbaum 2006 The Chilean school system provides us with an opportunity that is parallel to a differential effect.
Chilean schools are divided into primary and secondary schools. Primary schools are comprised of Grades 1-8 and secondary schools encompass Grades 9-12. Since 2003 students are required to attend both primary and secondary schools. However, primary and secondary schools need not be separate institutions. It is not uncommon for primary and secondary schools to be fused into a single school, such that students can attend Grades 1-12 at the same institution. Students that attend a primary only school have to select a secondary school once they reach Grade 8. In 2004, 76.4% of public schools and 52% of private voucher schools were primary only schools, and thus about 56% of students in the eighth grade had to select a new secondary school to attend (Lara et al. 2011) . We use this opportunity in our design by restricting the analysis to students from public primary schools that had to select a secondary school since they attended a primary only school. Under this design, treated students are students that switch from a public primary school to a private voucher secondary school. We compare these treated students to students in public primary only schools that choose to attend public secondary schools.
Exploiting this aspect of the Chilean school system has two advantages. First, it allows us to clearly delineate the temporal ordering of the treatment. Since the treatment is a private voucher secondary school, we may safely condition on covariates collected while students were in primary school. In this way we avoid biases from adjusting for a concomitant outcome (Rosenbaum 1984) . Second, we also suspect that a student that switches from a public to a private voucher school when they are not required to, may do so for a number of reasons, many of which are unobservable. Here, we restrict the analysis to students that attend their local public school and must switch due to school structure. This may be a more directly observable selection mechanism.
Longitudinal Census of Students and Schools
In 1988, Chile introduced a national student assessment system known as the Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación or SIMCE. The SIMCE is an "educational census."
That is, in the SIMCE, the Ministry of Education collects data to evaluate all students in fourth, eighth, tenth and eleventh grades in language, mathematics and sciences, roughly every two years.
SIMCE data are collected from four different sources. First, data are collected from students, which includes test scores that are complemented with other student covariates such as gender.
Second, both parents and teachers complete questionnaires. Finally, for schools test score are aggregated, and a few additional covariates are collected for both primary and secondary schools.
Students are given unique identifiers which allows us to form a true panel over a two year period.
Student records can also be linked to teacher, parent, and school level covariates. 
Data Structure and Study Design
In our study, the data structure and study design are intricately linked. We now outline how we constructed the match to fit the data structure. One advantage of our approach is that we can tailor the statistical adjustment to exactly fit the multilevel structure of the data, which is important since we have student, parent, teacher, and school level data. We perform two matches.
The first match, we deem a student level match for primary school students in 2004. The student level match, however, uses data from students, parents, teachers, and primary schools.
We start by describing the set of covariates that form the student level match. For each student with test scores observed in 2006, we match on student, parent, teacher, and primary school covariates from the SIMCE data collection in 2004. For the student match, we first list student level covariates. The key covariates, here, are student's test scores from the 8th grade. In 8th grade students are tested on four topics: language, mathematics, social sciences, and natural sciences. The student level data also measures gender. We match on all these students level covariates. From the parental data, we match on three covariates: income measured in six categories, father's education, and mother's education. We also link students to primary school level measures, so that we match on primary school covariates in the student level match. At the primary school level, we match on a five category socio-economic status indicator for each school that is created by the Chilean Ministry of Education. This five category indicator is constructed from questions based on parental education, family incomes in the school and an index of school vulnerability. We also use school level measures that are aggregates of data observed at other levels. As such, we also match on average test scores for each primary school, the number of teachers and the number of enrolled students. Finally, in the teacher survey, teachers are asked what level of education they expect the majority of their students to achieve. Teachers responded using a five category scale that records responses from 8th grade to a college degree.
We aggregate this measure and recorded the median for each school and use it in the student level match. To reiterate while we observed covariates measured at different levels in 2004, we treat all these measures as pre-treatment student level covariates, and they form the basis for the student level match.
The school match is based on secondary school data from 2003. Since the SIMCE forms a panel,
we can match on characteristics of the secondary schools before any student is exposed to the treatment. That is, we match on the schools the students will attend using data from before they attend that school. For the school match, we match on enrollment, school level math and language test score averages, the percentage of female students in the school, average student income, urban versus rural status, and the same five category socio-economic status indicator for each school that is recorded for primary schools.
3 Some of these covariates are aggregates that we created from either student, teacher, or parent level data in 2003. We did not match on several other covariates that are also observed in the 2003 data. These measures include whether teachers are allowed class preparation time, the proportion of teachers with a post-graduate diploma, the average teacher experience, the number of hours teachers worked per week. We do not match on these covariates since they are plausibly part of the school level treatment.
Matching on such covariates would remove their effect on students from the final outcomes and thus could potentially attenuate the treatment effect.
We describe the matching algorithm in greater detail in the next Section. However, first, we briefly relate that the match is based on integer programming which allows us to enforce different forms of balance for different covariates (Zubizarreta et al. 2013) . This is relevant since we describe the different balance constraints we applied to the various school and student level covariates.
Specifically, we applied to forms of covariate constraint. For many covariates, we only minimized the differences in means.
For the student level covariates, we applied a mean balance constraint to student level test score measures, primary school test score measures, primary school enrollment, the number of teachers in the primary school, the average expected level of educational attainment, and the proportion of female student in the primary school. For the school level match, we enforced a mean balance constraint on secondary school test scores, missingness indicators for test scores, secondary school enrollment, income category, SES category, urban or rural status, and the proportion of female students in the secondary school. For a number of both student and school level covariates, we used a fine balance constraint. Under fine balance, we exactly balance covariates without exactly matching. Fine balance is achieved for discrete covariates by balancing the marginal distributions of covariates exactly in aggregate but without constraining who is matched to whom. See Rosenbaum et al. (2007) for a discussion of fine balance and Rosenbaum (2010, Part II) for a discussion of different forms of covariate balance. We applied fine balance to student sex, father and mother's education level, parental income categories, and primary school SES categories. We now describe the notation matching algorithm.
Dynamic and Integer Programming for Multilevel Matching
The goal of our multilevel matching method is to approximate a paired clustered randomized experiment. In a paired clustered randomized experiment, treatment is randomly assigned between pairs of clusters of units and all the units within a cluster receive either treatment or control.
Because of randomization, in such an experiment the distributions of both observed and unobserved covariates -both at the cluster and unit levels-tend to be alike across the treatment and control groups. However, in the absence of randomization in an observational study there is no basis for covariates to be alike and we can match only for the covariates that we observe.
In view of this, the specific goal of our method is to approximate a paired clustered randomized experiment by finding the largest sample of matched pairs of treated and control units within matched pairs of treated and control clusters that is balanced on the observed covariates. For assessing the sensitivity of results to the influence of unobserved covariates we use the methods for sensitivity analysis proposed by Rosenbaum (1987 Rosenbaum ( , 2002 and tailored to clustered treatment assignments by Hansen et al. (2014) (see subsection 5.4 of the paper).
In our case study, units are students and clusters are schools, and, importantly, because results can be confounded both by student and school level covariates, we match pairs of students and schools to balance covariates at both levels. The basic tool that we use in our multilevel matching method is cardinality matching which we describe subsequently.
Review of Cardinality Matching
Common matching methods attempt to achieve covariate balance indirectly, by finding treated and control units that are close on a summary measure of the covariates such as the Mahalanobis distance or the propensity score (see Stuart 2010 and Lu et al. 2011 for reviews) . Unlike these matching methods, cardinality matching uses the original covariates to match units and directly balance their covariate distributions . Specifically, by solving an integer programming problem, cardinality matching finds the largest matched sample that satisfies the researcher's specifications for covariate balance. Following Zubizarreta (2012), these specifications for covariate balance may not only require mean balance, but perhaps also other forms of distributional balance such as fine balance (Rosenbaum et al. 2007 ), x-fine balance (Zubizarreta et al. 2011) , and strength-k matching (Hsu et al. 2014) . For example, cardinality matching will find the largest sample of matched pairs in which all the covariates have differences in means smaller than 0.1 standard deviations and the marginal distributions of nominal covariates of greater prognostic importance are perfectly balanced (fine balance). In this manner, with cardinality matching subject matter knowledge about the research question at hand comes straightforwardly into the matching problem through the specifications for covariate balance, finding the largest matched sample that satisfies them.
As we describe in the next subsection, our multilevel matching method uses cardinality matching to match treated and control students across all the possible combinations of treated and control schools, and then uses a modified version of cardinality matching to match schools with the largest number of matched students.
A Multistage Decision Method for Multilevel Matching
Intuition may suggest that the best way to match multilevel data is first to match clusters and then within matched clusters to match units. In our case study, this would require first pairing schools and then, within pairs of schools, pairing students. However this strategy will not always find the largest matched sample that is balanced as two schools that are paired on their school level characteristics may have different student compositions such that when their students are paired it may result in a smaller sample size than optimal. For this reason, the optimal matching strategy needs to contemplate what is optimal both at the student and school levels simultaneously. Applying Bellman's principle of optimality (Bellman 1957) , the optimal matching strategy is, under the assumption that schools have been matched optimally, first match students and then, considering these optimal student matches, match schools.
To formalize and implement this idea, let k t ∈ {1, ..., K t } index the treated schools and k c ∈ {1, ..., K c } index the control schools. Let j kt denote treated student j in treated school k t , with j kt ∈ {1, ..., J kt }, and j kc denote control student j in control school k c with j kc ∈ {1, ..., J kc }.
Let a kt,kc = 1 if treated school k t is paired to control school k c and a kt,kc = 0 otherwise; similarly let b j k t ,j kc = 1 if treated student j in treated school k t is paired to control student j in control school k c , and b j k t ,j kc = 0 otherwise.
In the first stage of our matching method, we find the maximum number of pairs of students that satisfies certain covariate balance specifications across all the possible K t × K c pairs of treated and control schools. This is, for all k t ∈ {1, ..., K t } and all k c ∈ {1, ..., K c } we find
subject to the pair matching constraints
which require matching each treated and control unit at most once, and covariate balancing constraints of the form
where h q (·) is a suitable transformation of the observed covariate x and ε q is a scalar indexed by q = 1, ..., Q. In other words, in this first stage we find the largest sample of pairs of students that is balanced as specified by h q (·) and ε q for q = 1, ..., Q across all pairs of treated and control schools (see section 4 for the covariate balance specifications actually required in our case study).
Then, in the second stage of our matching method, once we know how many balanced pair matches of students can be obtained across all the possible combinations of pairs of schools and collected these values in the matrix [n kt,kc ], we find the optimal school match that solves
again subject to pair matching and covariate balancing constraints analogous to (2)- (4) and (5) respectively (see section 4 for these specifications). In this manner, the multilevel matching problem can be solved optimally by breaking it into simpler matching subproblems and recursively finding the optimal match. This is an application of dynamic programming to matching in observational studies that takes advantage of the multilevel structure of the data (see Bertsekas 2005 for an extensive exposition of dynamic programming).
Extensions and Computation
In general, suppose that the decision variable a for matching units at the cluster level is required to be in a constraint set A, and for each a the decision variable b for matching units at the unit level is required to be in a constraint set B a . We want to optimize, say maximize, a function f (a, b) subject to the constraints A and B a , that is, find a and b to solve
In our application, f (a, b) is the number of matched students (the cardinality of the matched sample). Also, a determines which treated and control schools are matched, and b determines which treated and control students within which schools are matched as well. Specifically, a ∈ A constrains matched schools to have the properties of forming pairs and being balanced in a certain way, while b ∈ B a constrains matched students to come from matched schools in addition to also forming pairs and being balanced in a given way.
In a trivial way, we may solve (7) by first solving
for each a ∈ A, and then solving max a g(a) subject to a ∈ A.
In our case study, for each pairing of schools a, we find the best pairing of students b within those schools (8), and then pick the best pairing of schools with the associated best pairing of students for that pairing of schools (9). Notably, while (8) seems hard in general (because there are many possible choices of a), the nested structure of the students-in-schools problem makes it easier because f (a, b) separates into a into a sum of parts for school pairs. For example, if treated school k t is paired to control school k c , then the contribution of schools k t and k c is the same of number of pairs regardless of how the other schools are paired.
Note that if instead of having two matching levels we had three levels or more (such as students within schools within districts), then the multilevel matching procedure would extend naturally.
With l levels, the procedure would require first matching the lower level l under the assumptions that levels l − 1, l − 2, ..., 1 have been matched optimally, to then (once the matches at level l are completed) matching level l − 1 under the assumptions that levels l − 2, l − 3..., 1 have been matched optimally, and so on.
Note also that as presented here our multilevel matching method maximizes the size of the matched sample, but it can also be formulated to minimize a covariate distance between students.
If this was the case and if each of the student level matching problems was solved using optimal matching as in Rosenbaum (1989b) and Hansen (2007) then a trivial worst-case time bound for the multilevel matching method would be of order O(J 3 K 2 ) where J is the largest number of control students across all schools and K is the number of control schools. In general it is possible to find worst-case time bounds based on the component problems. In our method, each of the component problems is a cardinality matching problem and, while at the present there is no polynomial time algorithm for cardinality matching, in practice most instances with data sets of reasonable size run in time comparable to that of optimal matching. Furthermore, a useful feature of problem (7) is that the student level matches can be found in parallel by separating all the possible pairs of treated and control schools into smaller mutually exclusive but exhaustive pairs of treated and control schools. In practice, we found the matches using the package mipmatch for R (Zubizarreta 2012).
Covariate Balance in the Matched Sample
After applying basic exclusion criteria, there are 64245 students in 517 schools, 150 subsidized and 367 public schools (henceforth treated and control schools respectively). Out of the 64245 students, 15682 students are from treated schools and 48563 are from control schools. Using our multilevel matching method, we matched in two stages within similar groups regions of the country (namely, regions I-III, IV-V, VI-VII, VIII, IX, X-XII and the Metropolitan region).
At the student level, we used cardinality matching (1)-(5) to find the largest balanced samples of pairs of students across all the possible combinations of pairs of schools within the groups of regions. In each of these matches we required mean balance for 19 covariates (including student test scores, school test scores, and indicators for socioeconomic status and expected educational achievement; see Table 1 for details), fine balance for 4 covariates (sex, mother and father education, and household income; see Table 2 ) and distributional balance for the sum of the test scores in language and mathematics at baseline.
At the school level, we used the modification of cardinality matching (6) and mean balanced 16 other covariates: percentage female, total enrollment, language and math scores (plus indicators for missing values), urban area, parental income categories (1-5), and socioeconomic groups (A-D). Again, covariates were exact matched for the 7 region groups. We balanced all covariates with and without weighting for the size of the school; see Table 3 . Note that after matching all the differences in means are smaller than 0.05 standard deviations.
In this way, we matched 8130 students in 4065 pairs, and 166 schools in 83 pairs. Starting from the same student matches, we also found a more externally valid school in which all the differences in means are smaller than 0.15 standard deviations, and where 10776 students are matched in 5388 pairs and 210 schools are matched in 105 pairs. In the increased internal validity match, 7 out of the 13 region of the country are represented in both the treatment and control groups, whereas in the increased external validity match 12 out of the 13 regions are represented. 
Outcome Analyses
With the match complete, we now estimate the voucher school treatment effect with the matched data. We use randomization inference as the method for inference and estimation. The notation and methods we use are the basis for randomization inference with group randomized trials as developed by Small et al. (2008) . Later, we describe and apply a method of sensitivity analysis for group clustered observational studies developed in Hansen et al. (2014) . Sum of test scores in language and mathematics at baseline 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 
Notation: Treatment Effects for Students in Schools
There are S matched pairs of clusters, s = 1, . . . , S, with two schools, j = 1, 2, one treated and one control for 2S total units. The ordered pair sj thus identifies a unique cluster. Each cluster sj contains n sj > 1 individuals, i = 1, . . . , n sj . Each pair is matched for observed, pretreatment covariates, so x s11 = x s22 for each j and i, where x sji represents the observed covariates on which we matched. A student i in school sj is described by both observed covariates and an unobserved covariate u sji . The set (x sji , u sji ) may describe either the student sji or the school sj containing this student. In our study, treatment assignment occurs at the school level as whole schools are assigned to treatment or control. If the j th school in pair s receives the treatment, write Z sj = 1, whereas if this school receives the control, write Z sj = 0, so Z s1 + Z s2 = 1, for each s as each pair contains one treated school and one control school. If n sj = 1 for all sj then the clusters are individuals, and we have unclustered treatment assignment.
Each student has two potential responses; one response that is observed under treatment Z sj = 1 and the other observed under control Z sj = 0 (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974) . We denote these responses with (y T sji , y Csji ), where y T sji is observed from the ith subject in pair s under Z sj = 1, and y Csji is observed from this subject under Z sj = 0. In our application y T sji is the test score that student sji would exhibit if he or she switched from a public school to a private voucher school and y Csji is the test score this same student would exhibit if he or she attended a public school. Under this notation, we allow for interference among students in the same school but not across schools. In this context, y T sji denotes the response of student sji if all students in school sj receive the treatment, while y Csji denotes the response of student sji if all students in school sj receive the control. Therefore, we do not assume that we would observe the same response from student sji if the treatment were assigned to some but not all of the students in school sj.
For each student, the unobservable effect of treatment is y T sji − y Csji , which is the change in test scores induced by attending a private voucher school. We do not observe both potential outcomes, but we do observe responses: we test the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect on (y T sji , y Csji ) which stipulates that (Fisher 1935) . This hypothesis asserts that changing the treatment assigned to school sj would leave the response of student sji unchanged.
Randomization Inference When Treatment is Assigned at the School Level
In our analysis, we initially assume that treatment assignment is as-if randomly assigned to clusters conditional on the matches. In short, we assume as if the toss of a fair coin was used to allocate private voucher status within matched school pairs. This assumption about treatment assignment forms the basis for randomization inference in a paired group randomized experiment. We collect in the set Ω the 2 S treatment assignments for all 2S clusters: Z = (Z 11 , Z 12 , . . . , Z S2 ) T . In a matched-pair group randomized experiment, one treatment assignment Z sj would be picked at random and each assignment would therefore have probability Pr(Z = Z sj ) = 2 −S , which yields the randomization distribution. In an observational study, if the probability of receiving treatment is equal for both schools in each pair, then the conditional distribution of Z given that there is exactly one treated unit in each pair equals this randomization distribution, and
Pr(Z sj = 1) = 1/2 for each unit j in pair s (see Rosenbaum 2002 for details). However, in an observational study it may not be true Pr(Z sj = 1) = 1/2 for each unit j in pair s due to an unobserved covariate u ski . We explore this possibility through a sensitivity analysis described below.
To test Fisher's sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect, we define T a test statistic which is a function of Z and R where T = t(Z, R). Under the sharp null hypothesis R = y c , therefore
If the model for treatment assignment above were true then the randomization distribution for T is
since y c is fixed by conditioning on y T sji , y Csji , x sji , u ski and Pr(Z = Z sj |y T sji , y Csji , x sji , u ski , Ω) = 1/|Ω|. We use a test statistic from Hansen et al. (2014) that provides inferences for students in schools within this framework.
For this test statistic, q sji is a score or rank given to Y sji , so that under the null hypothesis, the q sji are functions of the y Csji and x sji , and they do not vary with Z sk . We define q sji to be resistant to outliers in the following way. Specifically, we follow Small et al. (2008) such that q sji are the ranks of the residuals when Y sji is regressed on the student level covariates using Huber's method of m-estimation. In this regression, we regressed the outcome, test scores recorded in 2006, on student level test scores recorded in 2004 when the student was still in primary school.
The test statistic T is a weighted sum of the mean ranks in the treated school minus the mean ranks in the control school. Formally the test statistic is Hansen et al. (2014) show that T is the sum of S independent random variables each taking the value ±Q s with probability 1/2, so E(T ) = 0 and var(T ) = The choice of weights w s has important implications in our application. Hansen et al. (2014) discuss three possible choices for w s . One possibility is to use constant weights, w s ∝ 1. Another possibility is to use weights that are proportional to the total number of students in a matched cluster pair: w s ∝ n s1 + n s2 or w s = (n s1 + n s2 )/ S l=1 (n 11 + n 12 ). These weights are particularly useful if we believe that the private school voucher effect varies with cluster size. This would be true if, for example, the private school effect was larger in smaller schools. However, if we suspect that the private voucher school effect is constant, we could select the weights to minimize the variance of T . For example, w s ∝ n s1 n s2 /(n s1 + n s2 ) will minimize the variance of T if cross cluster variability is low, while constant weights will minimize the variance if there is little variance within schools. Hansen et al. (2014) note that for testing the null hypothesis each set of weights is valid. Given that our cluster sizes exhibit considerable variation, and it is fully possible that the treatment effect varies with cluster size, we use all three sets of weights to test the sharp null hypothesis. We find that w s ∝ n s1 n s2 /(n s1 + n s2 ) and w s ∝ n s1 + n s2 lead to identical inferences and using constant weights changes the inference little. However, different sets of weights can affect the method of sensitivity analysis that we apply. Below we discuss how we incorporate the different weights into the sensitivity analysis.
If we test the hypothesis of a shift effect instead of the hypothesis of no effect, we can apply the method of Hodges and Lehmann (1963) to estimate the voucher school effect. The Hodges and
Lehmann (HL) estimate of τ is the value of τ 0 that when subtracted from Y sji makes T as as close as possible to its null expectation. Intuitively, the point estimateτ is the value of τ 0 such that T equals 0 when T τ 0 is computed from Y sji − Z sj τ 0 . Using constant effects is convenient, but this assumption can be relaxed; see Rosenbaum (2003) . If the treatment has an additive effect, Y sji = y Csji + τ then a 95% confidence interval for the additive treatment effect is formed by testing a series of hypotheses H 0 : τ = τ 0 and retaining the set of values of τ 0 not rejected at the 5% level.
Comparative Effectiveness of Public Versus Private Voucher Schools
We now test the hypothesis of no effect for private voucher schools. We test this hypothesis in both matches. For the match with greater external validity, with constant weights w s ∝ 1, the approximate one-sided p-value is 0.256. Thus we are unable to reject the null that the voucher school are completely without effect. We also applied both sets of alternative weights. We found that both sets of weights w s ∝ n s1 + n s2 and w s ∝ n s1 n s2 /(n s1 + n s2 ) lead to identical p-values of 0.292. Thus the inference is insensitive to the choice of weights. In the absence of bias from hidden confounders, the point estimate isτ = 2.81 with a 95% confidence interval of -5.68 and 11.34.
For the match with greater internal validity with constant weights, the approximate one-sided p-value is 0.492. Again, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect on test scores due to attending a private voucher school. If we use the two non-constant weights, we find the approximate one-sided p-value is 0.633. If there are no hidden confounders, the point estimate for the match with greater internal validity isτ = 0.0743 with a 95% confidence interval of -8.58 and 9.36. Thus for both matches, we cannot reject the hypothesis that attending a private voucher school has no effect on test scores. In one match, we went to greater lengths to remove overt bias. In this match it is notable that we can more decisively reject the sharp null hypothesis, and the point estimate is very nearly centered on zero. We next explore how likely it is that bias from a hidden confounder masks an actual treatment effect.
Test of Equivalence and Sensitivity Analysis
In an observational study, one concern is that bias from a hidden covariate can give the impression that a treatment effect exists when in fact no effect is present. Bias from hidden confounders can also mask an actual treatment effect leaving the analyst to conclude there is no effect when in fact such an effect exists. We explore this possibility using a test of equivalence and a sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 2008; Rosenbaum and Silber 2009; Rosenbaum 2010 ).
In our study, the treatment effect is defined as τ = y T sji − y Csji . Above we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that τ = 0 for all students. Next, we apply a test of equivalence to test the hypotheses that τ is not small. Under a test of equivalence, we test the following null hypothesis
= provides a basis for asserting with confidence that |τ | < δ. H With a test of equivalence, it is not possible to demonstrate a total absence of effect, but if this were a group randomized trial we could safely test that our estimated effect is not as large as δ. That is we may be able to reject H (δ) = : |τ | > δ. In an observational study, however, there are additional complications. Since the treatment was not randomly assigned, it may be the case that we reject the null hypothesis of equivalence due to hidden confounding. However, using a sensitivity analysis we may find evidence that the test of equivalence is insensitive to biases from nonrandom treatment assignment.
In a sensitivity analysis, we quantify the degree to which a key assumption must be violated in order for our inference to be reversed. Our model of treatment assignment assumes that within matched pairs, receipt of the treatment is effectively random conditional on the matches. We consider how sensitive our conclusions are to violations of this assumption using a model of sensitivity analysis discussed in Rosenbaum (2002, ch. 4) . In our study, matching on observed covariates x sji made students more similar in their chances of being exposed to the treatment.
However, we may have failed to match on an important unobserved covariate u sji such that
If true, the probability of being exposed to treatment may not be constant within matched pairs. To explore this possibility, we use a sensitivity analysis that imagines that before matching, student i in pair s had a probability, π s , of being exposed to the voucher school treatment. For two matched students in pair s, say i and i , because they have the same observed covariates x sji = x sji it may be true that π s = π s .
However, if these two students differ in an unobserved covariate, u sji = u sji , then these two students may differ in their odds of being exposed to the voucher school treatment by at most a factor of Γ ≥ 1 such that Hansen et al. (2014) note that sensitivity to hidden bias may vary with the choice of weights w s .
To understand whether different weights lead to different sensitivities to hidden confounders, we can conduct a different sensitivity analysis for each set of weights and correct these tests using a Bonferroni correction. However, Rosenbaum (2012) shows that the Bonferroni correction is overly conservative when applied to this form of sensitivity analysis. He develops an alternative multiple testing correction based on correlations among the test statistics. Under this correction, for a given value of Γ we conduct a sensitivity analysis using each set of weights. We then apply the multiple testing correction from Rosenbaum (2012) which produces a single corrected p-value for that value of Γ. We are interested in the value of Γ for which the corrected p-value exceeds the usual 0.05 threshold for statistical significance. If we find that the corrected p-value exceeds 0.05 for a larger value of Γ then we have greater confidence that our results are not sensitive to bias from hidden confounding.
How Much Bias Would Need to be Present to Mask a Positive
Effect of Private Voucher Schools?
We now apply the test of equivalence to both matches. In this test, the null hypothesis asserts deviations. This allows us to test whether the point estimates in our study are equivalent to small, medium or large voucher effects. Thus we define three values δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 to correspond to these three different possible effect sizes.
We first ask whether the point estimate from the match with greater external validity is large. with p-value of 0.036 when Γ = 1. Therefore, we are able to reject the null that the smaller treatment effect we observe in this design is equivalent to the smallest estimated effect in the extant literature. However, our inference would be easily reversed if bias from a confounder were present. We find that when Γ is as small as 1.1 the p-value for the test of equivalence is 0.048. Thus if students differed by as much as 10 percent in the odds of being treated that could explain our inference. For a moderate effect size of 0.30 standard deviations, we can easily reject H (δ 2 ) = when Γ = 1, and we find that when Γ = 2.16 the p-value is 0.049. This implies that the match with greater external validity is less sensitive to bias that the match with greater internal validity for an effect of a moderate size. Finally, for a large effect size we find that when Γ = 4.84, the p-value is 0.048. For a large effect, the match with a greater internal validity is more sensitive to bias from confounding than the match with greater external validity.
In sum, for both matches, we either cannot reject that the estimated effect is as large as the smallest effects found in previous studies or that association could be easily explained by unobserved confounding. Bias from an unobserved covariate would need to double the odds of selecting a private voucher school to mask a moderate size effect of 0.30 standard deviations. To mask a large effect size of 0.60 standard deviations, the bias from the unobserved founders would have to nearly quintuple the odds of differential treatment assignment. 
Summary and Discussion
Hierarchical or multilevel data structures are common in observational studies in the health and social sciences. Examples include patients in hospitals, workers in companies and, as in our case study, students in schools. As we discussed, in these settings the optimal matching strategy is to first match individuals and then, considering these optimal individual level matches, match clusters. By explicitly using the nested structure of the data, this strategy mimics a clustered randomized experiment and breaks the multilevel matching problem into simpler, smaller matching problems that can be solved in parallel which results in an optimal solution. We implemented this strategy using integer programming to find the largest sample of matched pairs of treated and control individuals within matched pairs of treated and control clusters that is balanced according to specifications given by the user. Unlike other methods for matching with multilevel data, our matching method is optimal (it maximizes the size of the study or minimizes the covariate distances between matched individuals) and it does not require estimating the propensity score (though it may be used in conjunction to a propensity score as an additional covariate in (5)).
